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October
2001
United
States vs. Ana Belen Montes
AFFIDAVIT
IN SUPPORT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINT,
ARREST WARRANT, AND SEARCH WARRANTS
I, Stephen A. McCoy, being duly sworn, hereby state the following
under penalty of perjury:
1. I am a Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
and have been so employed for approximately 20 years. I am currently
assigned to the Washington Field Office to a squad responsible for
counter-intelligence relating to Cuba. I have worked in the
counterintelligence field for approximately 15 years and have worked
specifically on counter-intelligence matters involving Cuba for the
last 12 years. As a result of my experience in counter-intelligence
investigations and foreign counter-intelligence training, I am
familiar with the strategy, tactics, methods, tradecraft and
techniques of the Cuban foreign intelligence service and its agents.
2. This affidavit is submitted in support of an application for a
complaint and arrest warrant charging ANA BELEN MONTES with conspiracy
to commit espionage, in violation of 18 U.S.C.§ 794(c), and for
applications for four (4) search warrants to search the following
items and locations:
(1)
the residence of ANA BELEN MONTES, such premises known and described
as a cooperative apartment located at 3039 Macomb Street, N.W.,
apartment 20, Washington, D.C. 20008, and further described in
Attachment A to this affidavit;
(2)
a red 2000 Toyota Echo, bearing vehicle identification number
JTDT1231Y0007841 and District of Columbia license plate number 993
190, which is registered to ANA BELEN MONTES and anticipated to be
within the District of Columbia;
(3)
room C6-146A, 200 MacDill Boulevard, Washington, D.C. 20340, which
is the office/work space assigned to ANA BELEN MONTES at the Defense
Intelligence Analysis Center located on Bolling Air Force Base;
(4)
safe deposit box #526 leased by ANA BELEN MONTES at Riggs Bank, N.A.,
Friendship Branch, 4249 Wisconsin Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C.
3.
Information in this affidavit is based on my personal knowledge and on
information provided to me by other counter-intelligence investigators
and law enforcement officers during the course of this investigation.
Searches and various forms of surveillance have been conducted
pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as
amended (FISA) and orders of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court (FISC).
I. Background
4. ANA BELEN MONTES is a United States citizen born on February 28,
1957, on a U.S. military installation in Nurnberg, Germany. She
graduated from the University of Virginia in 1979 and obtained a
masters degree from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced
International Studies in 1988. She is single and lives alone at 3039
Macomb Street, N.W., apartment 20, Washington, D.C. 20008, which
residence is further described in Attachment A. She has registered in
her name a red 2000 Toyota Echo, bearing vehicle identification number
JTDT1231Y0007841 and District of Columbia license plate number 993
190, which is regularly parked in the vicinity of her residence, and
which she regularly uses to commute to her place of employment.
5. MONTES is currently employed by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
as a senior
intelligence analyst. Her current office is at 200 MacDill Boulevard,
located on Bolling Air Force Base, Washington, D.C. 20340. Her
assigned office space is C6-146A. She has been employed by DIA as an
analyst since September 1985. Since 1992, she has specialized in Cuba
matters. She is currently the senior analyst responsible for matters
pertaining to Cuba. During the course of her employment, MONTES has
had direct and authorized access to classified information relating to
the national defense.
6. Records obtained from Riggs Bank reveal that MONTES has continually
leased safe deposit box number 526 at Riggs Bank, N.A., Friendship
Branch, 4249 Wisconsin Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. since September
2, 1993.
7. Classified information is defined by Executive Order No. 12,958, 60
Fed. Reg.19,825 (1995), as follows: information in any form that (1)
is owned by, produced by or for, or under the control of the United
States government; (2) falls within one or more of the categories set
forth in section 1.5 of the order (including intelligence sources and
methods, cryptology, military plans, and vulnerabilities or
capabilities of systems, installations, projects, or plans relating to
the national security), and (3) is classified by an original
classification authority who determines that its unauthorized
disclosure reasonably could be expected to result in damage to the
national security. Under the executive order, the designation
"Confidential" shall be applied to information, the
unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause
damage to the national security. The designation "Secret"
shall be applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which
reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national
security. The designation "Top Secret" shall be applied to
information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be
expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security.
8. In addition, Executive Order No. 12,958 provides that the
secretaries of State, Defense and Energy are authorized to create
"special access programs" upon certain specific findings
including that the vulnerability of, or threat to, specific classified
information is exceptional. Under such a program, the safeguarding and
access requirements to information covered by the program exceed those
normally required for information at the same classification level.
9. Under 32 C.F.R. § 159a.9, Sensitive Compartmented Information
(SCI) refers to information and material that requires special
controls for restricted handling.
10. During her employment at DIA, MONTES has continuously held a
security clearance and has had regular, authorized access to
classified information. I know that a person who receives such
clearances is required to be briefed on the procedures for properly
handling classified information and the penalties for failing to do
so, and that such a person must sign certifications of understanding
and agreement in connection with those briefings. I have reviewed a
"Classified Information Nondisclosure Agreement" (Standard
Form 189) that MONTES signed on September 30, 1985. In that document
MONTES acknowledged that she was aware that unauthorized disclosure of
classified information could cause irreparable injury to the United
States or could be used to advantage by a foreign nation, that she
would never divulge such information to an unauthorized person, and
that she understood that she was obligated to comply with laws and
regulations that prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of classified
information, and that she further understood such a disclosure could
constitute a violation of United States criminal law including 18
U.S.C. § 794. I have also reviewed a "Security
Briefing/Debriefing Acknowledgment" form signed by MONTES on May
15, 1997, briefing her into a Special Access Program (SAP). On this
date, specifically in connection with this SAP, MONTES signed a
Sensitive Compartmented Information Nondisclosure Agreement, in which
she acknowledged that the unauthorized disclosure of SCI may violate
federal criminal law, including 18 U.S.C. § 794, and that such
disclosure could cause irreparable injury to the United States or be
used to the advantage of a foreign nation.
II. MONTES's Toshiba Laptop Computer and Shortwave Radio
A. Communication From the Cuban Intelligence Service (CuIS) to MONTES
via Shortwave Radio
11. Based on my knowledge and familiarity with the methodology of the
Cuban intelligence service, I am aware that the CuIS often
communicates with clandestine CuIS agents operating outside Cuba by
broadcasting encrypted messages at certain high frequencies. Under
this method, the CuIS broadcasts on a particular frequency a series of
numbers. The clandestine agent, monitoring the message on a shortwave
radio, keys in the numbers onto a computer and then uses a diskette
containing a decryption program to convert the seemingly random series
of numbers into Spanish-language text. This was the methodology
employed by some of the defendants convicted last June in the Southern
District of Florida of espionage on behalf of Cuba and acting as
unregistered agents of Cuba, in the case of United States of America
v. Gerardo Hernandez, et al., Cr. No. 98-721-CR-Lenard(s)(s). Although
it is very difficult to decrypt a message without access to the
relevant decryption program, once decrypted on the agent's computer
the decrypted message resides on the computer's hard drive unless the
agent takes careful steps to cleanse the hard drive of the message.
Simply "deleting" the file is not sufficient.
12. Based on the evidence described below, I have concluded that
MONTES was a clandestine CuIS agent who communicated with her handling
CuIS officer in the manner described above.
13. A receipt obtained from a CompUSA store located in Alexandria,
Virginia indicated that on October 5, 1996, one "Ana B.
Montes" purchased a refurbished Toshiba laptop computer, model
405CS, serial number 10568512.
14. During a court-authorized surreptitious entry into MONTES's
residence, conducted by the FBI on May 25, 2001, FBI agents observed
in her residence a Toshiba laptop computer with the serial number set
out above. During the search, the agents electronically copied the
laptop's hard drive. During subsequent analysis of the copied hard
drive, the FBI recovered substantial text that had been deleted from
the laptop's hard drive.
15. The recovered text from the laptop's hard drive included
significant portions of a Spanish language message, which when printed
out with standard font comes to approximately 11 pages of text. The
recovered portion of the message does not expressly indicate when it
was composed. However, it instructs the message recipient to travel to
"the Friendship Heights station" on "Saturday, November
23rd." My review of a calendar indicates that November 23 fell on
a Saturday in 1996; the next time thereafter November 23 falls on a
Saturday is in 2002. Accordingly, this message was composed sometime
before November 23, 1996, and entered onto MONTES's laptop sometime
after October 5, 1996, the date she purchased it. Based on its
content, I have concluded that it is a message from a CuIS officer to
MONTES.
16. Portions of the recovered message included the following:
"You should go to the WIPE program and destroy that file
according to the steps which we discussed during the contact. This is
a basic step to take every time you receive a radio message or some
disk."
17. During this same search, the agents also observed a Sony shortwave
radio stored in a previously opened box on the floor of the bedroom.
The agents turned on the radio to confirm that it was operable. Also
found was an earpiece that could be utilized with this shortwave
radio, allowing the radio to be listened to more privately. Similar
earpieces were found in the residences of the defendants in the
Hernandez case, as described above in paragraph 11.
18.
The recovered portion of the message begins with the following
passage:
Nevertheless,
I learned that you entered the code communicating that you were having
problems with radio reception. The code alone covers a lot, meaning
that we do not know specifically what types of difficulty you are
having. Given that it's only been a few days since we began the use of
new systems, let's not rule out that the problem might be related to
them. In that case, I'm going to repeat the necessary steps to take in
order to retrieve a message.
The
message then describes how the person reading the message should
"write the information you send to us and the numbers of the radio
messages which you receive." The message later refers to going
"to a new line when you get to the group 10 of the numbers that you
receive via radio," and still later gives as an "example"
a series of groups of numbers: "22333 44444 77645 77647 90909 13425
76490 78399 7865498534." After some further instruction, the
message states:
"Here
the program deciphers the message and it retrieves the text onto the
screen, asking you if the text is okay or not." Near the
conclusion of the message, there is the statement "In this
shipment you will receive the following disks: . . . 2) Disk
"R1" to decipher our mailings and radio."
19. Further analysis of MONTES's copied Toshiba hard drive identified
text consisting of a series of 150 5-number groups. The text begins,
"30107 24624," and continues until 150 such groups are listed.
The FBI has determined that the precise same numbers, in the precise
same order, were broadcast on February 6, 1999, at AM frequency 7887
kHz, by a woman speaking Spanish, who introduced the broadcast with the
words "Attencion! Attencion!" The frequency used in that
February 1999 broadcast is within the frequency range of the shortwave
radio observed in MONTES's residence on May 25, 2001.
B. Communication Between the CuIS and MONTES via Computer Diskette
20. Based on my knowledge of the methodology employed by the CuIS, I am
aware that a clandestine CuIS agent often communicates with his or her
handling CuIS officer by typing a message onto a computer, and then
encrypting and saving it to a diskette. The agent thereafter physically
delivers the diskette, either directly or indirectly, to the officer. In
addition, as an alternative to sending an encrypted shortwave radio
broadcast, a CuIS officer often will similarly place an encrypted
message onto a diskette and again simply physically deliver the
diskette, clandestinely, to the agent. Upon receipt of the encrypted
message, either by the CuIS officer or the agent, the recipient employs
a decryption program contained on a separate diskette to decrypt the
message. The exchange of diskettes containing encrypted messages, and
the use of decryption programs contained on separate diskettes, was one
of the clandestine communication techniques utilized by the defendants
in the Hernandez case described above in paragraph 11. Although it is
difficult to decrypt a message without the decryption program, the very
process of encrypting or decrypting a message on a computer causes a
decrypted copy of the message to be placed on the computer's hard drive.
Unless affirmative steps are taken to cleanse the hard drive, beyond
simply "deleting" the message, the message can be retrieved
from the hard drive.
21. Based on the evidence described below, I have concluded that MONTES
was a CuIS agent who communicated with her CuIS handling officer by
passing and receiving computer diskettes containing encrypted messages.
22. The message described above that was contained on the hard drive of
MONTES's laptop computer contained the following passage:
Continue writing along the same lines you have so far, but cipher the
information every time you do, so that you do not leave prepared
information that is not ciphered in the house. This is the most
sensitive and compromising information that you hold. We realize that
this entails the difficulty of not being able to revise or consult
what was written previously before each shipment, but we think it is
worth taking this provisional measure. It is not a problem for us if
some intelligence element comes repeated or with another defect which
obviously cannot help, we understand this perfectly.-- Give
"E" only the ciphered disks. Do not give, for the time
being, printed or photographed material. Keep the materials which you
can justify keeping until we agree that you can deliver them.-- Keep
up the measure of formatting the disks we send you with couriers or
letters as soon as possible, leaving conventional notes as reminders
only of those things to reply to or report.
The message goes on to refer to a "shipment" that contains
"Disk 'S1' - to cipher the information you send," and, as
indicated in the previous section, to "Disk 'R1' to decipher our
mailings and radio." Earlier in the message, there is a reference
to "information you receive either via radio or disk."
23. During the court-authorized search of the residence on May 25, 2001,
two boxes containing a total of 16 diskettes were observed. During a
subsequent such search on August 8, 2001, a box containing 41 diskettes,
later determined to be blank, were observed. Finally, records obtained
from a Radio Shack store located near MONTES's residence indicate that
MONTES purchased 160 floppy diskettes during the period May 1, 1993, to
November 2, 1997.
III. Communication from MONTES to the CuIS by Pager
24. Based on my knowledge of the methodology employed by the CuIS, I am
aware that a clandestine CuIS agent often communicates with his or her
handling CuIS officer by making calls to a pager number from a pay
telephone booth and entering a pre-assigned code to convey a particular
message. This methodology was utilized by the defendants in the
Hernandez case described above in paragraph 11.
25. Based on the evidence described below, I believe that MONTES has
been communicating with her handling CuIS officer in this fashion.
26. In the same message copied from MONTES's hard drive that has been
described earlier in this affidavit, there is a passage that states:
C) Beepers that you have. The only beepers in use at present are the
following: 1) (917) [first seven-digit telephone number omitted from
this application], use it with identification code 635. 2) (917)
[second seven-digit telephone number omitted from this application].
Use it with identification code 937. 3) (917) [third seven-digit
telephone number omitted from this application] Use it only with
identification code 2900 . . . because this beeper is public, in other
words it is known to belong to the Cuban Mission at the UN and we
assume there is some control over it. You may use this beeper only in
the event you cannot communicate with those mentioned in 1) and 2),
which are secure.
Based on my experience and knowledge, I have concluded that the
reference to "control over it" in the above passage refers to
the CuIS officer's suspicion that the FBI is aware that this beeper
number is associated with the Cuban government and is monitoring it in
some fashion.
27. In addition, as described previously, the message on the laptop's
hard drive includes a portion stating that the message recipient
"entered the code communicating that you were having problems with
radio reception." Based on the evidence described above, I have
concluded this portion of the message indicates that MONTES at some
point shortly prior to receiving the message sent a page to her CuIS
officer handler consisting of a pre-assigned series of numbers to
indicate she was having communication problems.
28. Based on evidence obtained during the FBI's physical surveillance of
MONTES conducted between May and September 2001, I have concluded that
MONTES continues to send coded pages to the CuIS. This evidence is
described below in paragraphs 38 to 45.
III. MONTES's Transmission of Classified Information to the CuIS
29. The same message described above, as well as other messages
recovered from the laptop's hard drive, contained the following
information indicating that MONTES had been tasked to provide and did
provide classified information to the CuIS.
30. In one portion of the message discussed above, the CuIS officer
states:
What
*** said during the meeting . . . was very interesting. Surely you
remember well his plans and expectations when he was coming here. If I
remember right, on that occasion, we told you how tremendously useful
the information you gave us from the meetings with him resulted, and
how we were waiting here for him with open arms.
31. I have replaced in this application with "***" a word that
begins with a capital letter, which was not translated, and is in fact
the true last name of a U.S. intelligence officer who was present in an
undercover capacity, in Cuba, during a period that began prior to
October 1996. The above quoted portion of the message indicates that
MONTES disclosed the U.S. officer's intelligence agency affiliation and
anticipated presence in Cuba to the CuIS, which information is
classified "Secret." As a result, the Cuban government was
able to direct its counter-intelligence resources against the U.S.
officer ("we were waiting here for him with open arms").
32. The very next section in the message states:
We think the opportunity you will have to participate in the ACOM
exercise in December is very good. Practically, everything that takes
place there will be of intelligence value. Let's see if it deals with
contingency plans and specific targets in Cuba, which are to
prioritized interests for us.
33. I have concluded that the "ACOM exercise in December" is a
reference to a December 1996 war games exercise conducted by the U.S.
Atlantic Command, a U.S. Department of Defense unified command, in
Norfolk, Virginia. Details about the exercise's "contingency plans
and specific targets" is classified "Secret" and relates
to the national defense of the United States.
34. DIA has advised that MONTES attended the above exercise in Norfolk,
as part of her official DIA duties.
35. In a separate message partially recovered from the hard drive of
MONTES's Toshiba laptop, the message reveals details about a particular
Special Access Program (SAP) related to the national defense of the
United States, and states: "In addition, just today the agency made
me enter into a program, 'special access top secret. [First name, last
name omitted from this application] and I are the only ones in my office
who know about the program." The details related about this SAP in
this message are classified "Top Secret" / SCI.
36. DIA has confirmed that MONTES and a colleague with the same name as
that related in the portion of the message described above were briefed
into this SAP, together, on May 15, 1997. Accordingly, I have concluded
that the above message from MONTES to a CuIS officer.
37. In yet another message recovered from the laptop, there is a
statement revealing that "we have noticed" the location,
number and type of certain Cuban military weapons in Cuba. This
information is precisely the type of information that is within MONTES's
area of expertise, and is, in fact, an accurate statement of the U.S.
intelligence community's knowledge on this particular issue. The
information is classified "Secret." Accordingly, I have
concluded that this message also is a message from MONTES to a CuIS
officer.
FBI Physical Surveillance of MONTES and Telephone Records for May to
September 2001
38. FBI physical surveillance of MONTES has shown a recent pattern of
pay telephone calls by her to a pager number, a communication method
that, as described above in paragraph 24, is consistent with known CuIS
communications plans and operations. In each paragraph below that refers
to MONTES driving, she was utilizing the Toyota described above in
paragraph 2.
39. The FBI maintained periodic physical surveillance of MONTES during
the period May to September 2001. On May 20, 2001, MONTES left her
residence and drove to the Hecht's on Wisconsin Avenue, in Chevy Chase,
Maryland. She entered the store at 1:07 p.m. and exited by the rear
entrance at 1:27 p.m. She then sat down on a stone wall outside the rear
entrance and waited for approximately two minutes. At 1:30 p.m., the FBI
observed her walk to a pay phone approximately 20 feet from where she
was sitting. She placed a one minute call to a pager number using a
pre-paid calling card. At 1:45 p.m. she drove out of the Hecht's lot and
headed north on Wisconsin Avenue toward Bethesda, Maryland. At 1:52 p.m.
she parked her car in a lot and went into Modell's Sporting Goods store.
She quickly exited the store carrying a bag and crossed Wisconsin Avenue
to an Exxon station. She was observed looking over her right and left
shoulders as she crossed the Exxon lot. At 2:00 p.m. she placed a one
minute call from a pay phone at the Exxon station to the same pager
number using the same pre-paid calling card. By 2:08 p.m., MONTES had
walked back to her vehicle and was driving back to her residence where
she arrived at 2:30 p.m.
40. On June 3, 2001, MONTES engaged in similar communications activity.
She left her residence at approximately 2:30 p.m. and drove to a bank
parking lot at the corner of Harrison Street, N.W. and Wisconsin Avenue,
N.W. She exited her car at approximately 2:37 pm and entered a Borders
Book Store on Wisconsin Avenue. She left the store approximately 40
minutes later. She then crossed Wisconsin Avenue to the vicinity of
three public pay phones near the southern exit of the Friendship Heights
Metro Station. At 3:28 p.m. she placed a one-minute call using the same
prepaid calling card to the same pager number she had called on May 20,
2001. After a few minutes, she walked back to her car and drove to a
grocery store.
41. Pursuant to court authorization, on August 16, 2001, the FBI
searched MONTES's pocketbook. In a separate compartment of MONTES's
wallet, the FBI found the pre-paid calling card used to place the calls
on May 20, 2001 and June 3, 2001. In the same small compartment, the FBI
located a slip of paper on which was written the pager number she had
called. Written above this pager number was a set of digits that I
believe comprise one or more codes for MONTES to use after calling the
pager number, i.e., after contacting the pager, she keys in a code to be
sent to the pager which communicates a particular pre-established
message.
42. On August 26, 2001, at approximately 10:00 a.m., the FBI observed
MONTES making a brief pay telephone call to the same pager number from a
gas station/convenience store located at the intersection of Connecticut
and Nebraska Avenues, N.W., in Washington, D.C.
43. On September 14, 2001, MONTES left work and drove directly to her
residence. She then walked to Connecticut Avenue, N.W., in Washington,
D.C., still wearing her business clothes, and made a stop at a dry
cleaning shop. She then entered the National Zoo through the Connecticut
Avenue entrance. She proceeded to the "Prairie Land" overlook
where she stayed for only 30 seconds. She then walked further into the
zoo compound and basically re-traced her route out of the zoo. At
approximately 6:30 p.m. MONTES removed a small piece of paper or card
from her wallet and walked to a public phone booth located just outside
the pedestrian entrance to the zoo. MONTES then made what telephone
records confirmed to be two calls to the same pager number she had
called in May, June and August, as described above. The records reflect
that the first call was unsuccessful, i.e., the call lasted zero
seconds. According to the records, she made a second call one minute
later that lasted 33 seconds. Shortly after making these calls, MONTES
looked at her watch and then proceeded to walk back to her residence.
43. On September 15, 2001, telephone records pertaining to the pre-paid
calling card number on the card observed in her pocketbook on August 16,
2001, show that MONTES made a call to the same pager number at 11:12
a.m. that lasted one minute.
44. On September 16, 2001, MONTES left her residence in the early
afternoon and took the Metro (Red Line) to the Van Ness - UDC station in
Washington, D.C. She made a brief telephone call from a payphone in the
Metro station at approximately 1:50 p.m., again to the same pager
number.
45. MONTES is known to possess a cell phone. A cell phone was observed
during a court authorized search of her tote bag on August 16, 2001. In
addition, during surveillance on September 16, 2001, MONTES was observed
speaking on a cell phone. Furthermore, telephone records obtained in May
2001 confirm that she has subscribed to cell telephone service
continually from October 26, 1996 to May 14, 2001. MONTES's use of
public pay phones notwithstanding her access to a cell phone supports my
conclusion that the pay phone calls described in this section were in
furtherance of MONTES's espionage.
Probable Cause to Seize Documents, Materials and Computer Media
46. My experience has shown that individuals involved in espionage very
often maintain copies of correspondence, draft documents and even
classified government documents which are themselves of evidentiary
value, along with evidence of criminal and other associations. This
evidence includes directories, lists, news articles, photographs, travel
and similar material. The items and materials utilized by persons
engaged in espionage is further described in Attachment B.
47. MONTES is known to have both a laptop and a desktop computer in her
residence. In addition, she utilizes a desktop computer in her office in
the DIAC. These computers may be attached to peripherals such as
printers when the search warrants are executed. Searching these computer
systems may require a range of data analysis techniques. In some cases,
it is possible for the agents to conduct carefully targeted searches
that can locate evidence without requiring a time consuming manual
search through unrelated materials that may be commingled with criminal
evidence. Similarly, agents may be able to locate the materials covered
in the warrant by looking for particular directory or file names. In
other cases, however, such techniques may not yield the evidence
described in the warrant. Criminals can mislabel or hide files and
directories; encode communications to avoid using key words; attempt to
delete files to evade detection; or take other steps designed to
frustrate law enforcement searches for information. These steps all are
anticipated to be applicable in this case. These steps may require
agents to conduct more extensive searches, which can more easily be
accomplished with equipment that cannot be brought to the search sites,
such as scanning areas of the disk not allocated to listed files, or
opening every file and scanning its contents briefly to determine
whether it falls within the scope of the warrant. In light of these
difficulties, your affiant requests permission to use whatever data
analysis techniques appear necessary to locate and retrieve the evidence
in the computers, diskettes, and peripherals that are located within the
places and items to be searched, and to remove these items from the
places to be searched so that the items may be searched more thoroughly.
Conclusion
48. Based on the evidence described above, I believe probable cause
exists that from on or about October 5, 1996, to the date of this
affidavit, in the District of Columbia and elsewhere, ANA BELEN MONTES,
conspired, confederated and agreed with persons known and unknown to
violate 18 U.S.C. § 794(a), that is, to communicate, deliver and
transmit to the government of Cuba and its representatives, officers and
agents, information relating to the national defense of the United
States, with the intent and reason to believe that the information was
to be used to the injury of the United States and to the advantage of
Cuba, and that MONTES committed acts to effect the object of this
conspiracy in the District of Columbia and elsewhere, all in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 794(c).
49. I further believe that probable cause exists that the items and
locations described in Attachment A contain evidence, fruits, and
instrumentalities relating to the above violation, which evidence fruits
and instrumentalities are further described in Attachment B.
STEPHEN A. McCOY, Special Agent Federal Bureau of Investigation
SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED BEFORE ME THIS DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2001.
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
ATTACHMENT A
The residence of ANA BELEN MONTES is located at 3039 Macomb Street,
N.W., apartment 20, Washington, D.C. 20008. 3039 Macomb Street, N.W., is
titled "The Cleveland Apartments," and is a three story, red
brick building. Apartment 20 is on the second floor and is the first
door on the left.
ATTACHMENT B
1. Espionage paraphernalia, including devices designed to conceal and
transmit national defense and classified intelligence information and
material, and implements used by espionage agents to communicate with
their handlers and with a foreign government, to wit: white tape,
mailing tape, colored chalk (all used for signaling purposes), coded
pads, secret writing paper, microdots, any letters, notes or other
written communications (including contact instructions) between
defendant ANA BELEN MONTES and any agents of the CuIS or other
intelligence service of Cuba; any computers, (including laptops),
computer disks, cameras, film, codes, telephone numbers, maps,
photographs and other materials relating to communication procedures,
correspondence;
2.
Records, notes, calendars, journals, maps, instructions, and classified
documents and other papers and documents relating to the transmittal of
national defense and classified intelligence information (including the
identities of foreign espionage agents and intelligence officers and
other foreign assets or sources providing information to the United
States Intelligence Community, such as the FBI and CIA; records of
previous illicit espionage transactions, national defense transactions,
national defense and classified intelligence information, including
copies of documents copied or downloaded by ANA BELEN MONTES from the
DIA);
3. Passports, visas, calendars, date books, address books, credit card,
hotel receipts and airline records, reflecting travel in furtherance of
espionage activities;
4. Identity documents, including but not limited to passports, licenses,
visas (including those in fictitious or alias identities), U.S. and
foreign currency, instructions, maps, photographs, U.S. and foreign bank
account access numbers and instructions and other papers and materials
relating to emergency contact procedures and escape routes;
5. Safety deposit box records, including signature cards, bills, and
payment records, safety deposit box keys, whether in the name of the
defendant or a family member; any records pertaining to any commercial
storage sites where the defendant may be storing other classified
intelligence and counter-intelligence documents or other records of her
espionage activities;
6. Federal, state and local tax returns, work sheets, W-2 forms, 1099
forms, and any related schedules;
7. Telephone bills and records, including calling cards and pager
records;
8.
Photographs, including photographs of co-conspirators; correspondence
(including envelopes) to and from ANA BELEN MONTES and handlers,
contacts and intelligence agents of Cuba;
9. Computer hardware, software, and storage media, known to be used by
the defendant or to which she had access, including, but not limited to:
any personal computer, laptop computer, modem, and server, which have
been and are being used to commit the offenses of espionage and
conspiracy to commit espionage; records, information and files contained
within such computer hardware containing evidence and fruits of
defendant's espionage activity between October 5, 1996, and the present,
including classified documents, in whatever form and by whatever means
they have been created or stored, including but not limited to any
electrical, electronic, or magnetic form of storage device; floppy
diskettes, hard disks, zip disks, CD-ROMs, optical discs, backup tapes,
printer buffers, smart cards, memory calculators, pagers, personal
digital assistants such as Palm III devices, removable hard drives,
memory cards, zip drives, and any photographic forms of such records
including microfilm, digital prints, slides, negatives, microfiche,
photocopies, and videotapes, computer terminals and printers used by the
defendant in said espionage activity.
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